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Abstract: This White Volume assesses U.S. long term national security 
challenges, employing a global perspective that accounts for the changing 
political, economic, social, and psychological profiles of populations, and 
the rapid changes they experience in a globally connected information en-
vironment.  It addresses many of the key national security challenges iden-
tified by LTG Flynn in the Preface. The collection of essays explores future 
population-centric national security challenges through the lens of the lat-
est research from the social, neurological, and complexity sciences. The 
papers emphasize “enduring” long term themes that are focused on the in-
teractions of populations and their environments. They are not U.S.-
centric, but multi-perspective and examine underlying long term phenom-
ena. 
The target audiences are planners, operators, and policy makers. With 
them in mind, the articles are intentionally kept short and written to stand 
alone. All the contributors have done their best to make their articles easi-
ly accessible.  
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3.5 In-group/out-group distinctions—neuroscience findings and 
upshot 
Dr. Emile Bruneau 
For many, the U.S. is viewed as “the enemy.” Obviously, safeguarding 
American lives requires addressing two components of threat from people 
who hold this view: decreasing their capability to do harm, and decreasing 
their motivation to do harm. While compromising an “enemy group’s” ca-
pability to harm the U.S. falls largely outside of the purview of social sci-
ence, understanding and addressing the motivations behind violent ag-
gression falls squarely in the realm of social psychology. Much research in 
social psychology has focused on more innocuous forms of intergroup con-
flict between arbitrarily assigned groups, or between ethnic groups in mul-
ticultural societies. Many (but not all) of the insights from these studies 
join an emerging focus specifically on the psychological biases affecting 
conflict groups to provide some guidelines for recognizing and addressing 
the root motivations of political violence. 
Some of the forces driving conflict and inhibiting reconciliation are clear 
and tangible: competition for limited resources, a history of violence, and 
differences in cultural and religious beliefs. Inter-group antagonism and 
political violence can clearly be motivated by such factors: a young man 
might be motivated to commit an act of violence against the U.S. because 
his relative was killed by a drone strike; because he believes that his land 
or resources are being stolen; because he sees his cultural or religious be-
liefs threatened. Accompanying these socio-political factors is a collection 
of psychological factors that can also motivate hostility. The same young 
man could be tipped towards violence, for example, by extreme empathy 
for the suffering of in-group members, and lack of empathy for out-group 
members; because he views Americans as untrustworthy or irrational; be-
cause he views American motivations as unworthy rationalizations rather 
than reasonable justifications. These psychological biases can be just as 
potent as political factors in motivating intergroup aggression. 
In this paper, we highlight examples of “hot” and “cold” psychological bi-
ases that help drive intergroup hostility and prevent the resolution of in-
tractable conflicts, suggest how these biases can (and cannot) be reduced 
with positive interventions, and highlight the potential lessons for people 
tasked with safeguarding American national security. 
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3.5.1 Psychological biases 
3.5.1.1 Empathy 
Much of the time, we feel pain or sadness in response to another’s suffer-
ing. A key component of this response is the suite of cognitive and affective 
capacities called empathy (Batson 2009): people recognize emotional ex-
periences in others, experience matched sensations and emotions, and are 
motivated to alleviate the others’ suffering, which frequently results in 
helping behaviors.  
Empathy is a central pillar of modern human society: it serves simultane-
ously as “gas” for pro-social behavior (e.g., helping), and a “brake” on anti-
social behavior (e.g., aggression). From a young age, typical people are af-
fected by another's suffering: they “step into the other person’s shoes,” 
“feel their pain,” and are motivated to help (Batson 2009). At other times, 
however, they feel (and do) nothing at all. This flexibility is another hall-
mark of human empathy. The lighter side of this ability is prominently 
displayed in professions that require frequent exposure to human suffer-
ing (doctors, nurses, social workers, and aid workers). Empathic regula-
tion also allows us to make everyday decisions that require increasing oth-
ers’ (short-term) suffering for a greater good (e.g., preventing a child from 
playing with something that is dangerous to them, firing an ill-qualified 
employee, making a battlefield decision). 
The darker side of empathic flexibility is often displayed in the context of 
intergroup relations. When an out-group is perceived as antagonistic, peo-
ple respond less empathically to out-group members, but also more em-
pathically to in-group members (Dovidio et al. 2010). It has been suggest-
ed that the motivation to help in-group members, and hostility toward 
people from other ethnic or racial groups, may have co-evolved in humans: 
group survival is more likely when many members are willing to fight in 
inter-group wars and even sacrifice themselves to protect others in their 
group (Choi and Bowles 2007). The most dramatic incidents of intergroup 
violence are consistent with these suggestions: most suicide bombers are 
not psychopaths, but rather may experience “parochial altruism,” or high 
empathy selectively for their own group’s suffering (Ginges et al. 2007). 
This suggests that the most useful metric of empathy for understanding 
political violence may be the gap between in-group empathy and out-
group empathy, for which humans may have a particular susceptibility. 
We call this the “intergroup empathy bias.” 
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As empathy is such a fundamental psychological force, and is so dramati-
cally affected by group identity, it is important to understand the root 
causes and consequences of group-based empathy. One of the “cleaner” 
ways to study the intergroup empathy bias (outside of the complexities of 
historical violence, ethnic rivalry, and religious differences) is to examine 
the effect in minimal groups—groups in which the boundary is arbitrary 
(e.g., red team and blue team). Children randomly assigned to color teams 
show greater empathy for in-group members than for out-group members 
when those children are socially rejected (Masten et al. 2010). Recent work 
in our lab with adults has shown that intergroup empathy biases (how bad 
and how good participants report feeling in response to in-group and out-
group fortunes and misfortunes) are determined less by self-reported trait 
empathy, and more by how strongly group members identify with their 
own group relative to the other group. That is, the most dramatic differ-
ences in intergroup empathy bias (which characterize many people who 
commit acts of extreme violence) are better predicted by tribalism than 
sociopathy. 
The intergroup empathy bias is established rapidly and difficult to shake; 
however, two methods are successful at decreasing this bias. In one ver-
sion of our study, we provided one group of participants with a graphical 
representation of the in-group and out-group that presented them as over-
lapping networks of individuals, and another group with graphical repre-
sentations of the in-group and out-group that presented them as distinct 
networks of individuals. Everything else about the study was identical in 
both conditions. Although both representations were bogus (and meaning-
less), the intergroup empathy bias was significantly decreased when 
groups were represented as more integrated and overlapping. Therefore, 
the mere perception of intergroup similarity or overlap can mitigate the 
intergroup empathy bias. 
In another version of the study, we examined how framing the information 
affected the intergroup empathy bias. In this version, one group of partici-
pants was presented with “headlines” of in-group and out-group members’ 
fortunes/misfortunes, and another group was presented with the head-
lines embedded in a short narrative about each protagonist. We found that 
including the narrative significantly decreased the intergroup empathy bi-
as by drawing participants’ attention away from group membership and 
towards individual experiences. 
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Characterizing the boundary conditions of the narratives (i.e., what types 
of information or style of narratives generate the greatest effect), and de-
termining how effective these mitigating factors are in the context of real 
intergroup conflict is currently being investigated. However, these initial 
results suggest that the framing of the groups and the information can 
dramatically alter the intergroup empathy bias. 
3.5.1.2 Reasoning 
The combination of enhanced in-group empathy and failed out-group em-
pathy may provide a “hot,” emotional motivation for political violence. At 
the same time, a group of “cold,” and seemingly more rational, biases may 
also drive hostility. 
Humans are “naïve realists,” believing that they have an objective view of 
reality (Ross and Ward 1994, 1996). This creates a problem when we en-
counter disagreement with another. Naive realism predicts that people 
first assume that the other person lacks the correct perspective on the is-
sues—“If only they knew what I knew, they would agree with me.” Howev-
er, when simple exchange of information fails to resolve the disagreement, 
people quickly switch to the interpretation that the other person or group 
is inherently biased and irrational. For example, in a disagreement among 
students over academic policy, each side is more likely to ascribe “valid” 
reasons over “biasing” reasons for their own position, but “biasing” rea-
sons over “valid” reasons for the student they disagree with (Pronin et al. 
2004). This effect has also been demonstrated at the group level: when 
asked about their views of the conflict in the Middle East, Jewish and Arab 
American respondents each report that their own identities provide in-
sights on the issues, while the others’ identity confers bias (Ehrlinger et al. 
2005). 
The greater the divide in opinion is, the more people assume that another’s 
views are based on non-normative factors like bias and ideology. The per-
ception of out-group bias is thus exacerbated by another psychological bi-
as: partisans tend to over-estimate their disagreements with the other 
group. This “false polarization bias” acts at the group level, amplifying the 
perception of disagreement between groups beyond the actual levels of 
disagreement, specifically for one’s most strongly held views (Chambers et 
al. 2006; Robinson et al. 1995). 
National Security Challenges Approved for Public Release 158 
 
The perception of out-group bias can fuel political violence. Perceiving the 
other as biased makes people less willing to cooperate or negotiate with 
the other side, and more inclined towards aggressive or competitive ac-
tions, like sanctions or shows of force (Kennedy and Pronin 2008). This 
has been hypothesized to lead to a “perception of bias-conflict spiral.” The 
first side sees the group differences as amplified, and differences in opin-
ion are perceived as wider than they are; these differences in opinion ac-
centuate the perception of the second side’s views as biased and irrational; 
seeing the second side as biased leads the first side to choose conflict-
escalating behaviors and reduce the tendency towards rational negotia-
tion; these actions reinforce the second side’s perception of the first side as 
irrational and biased, thus continuing the cycle. Altogether, this spiral of 
psychological effects drives partisans towards more adversarial options 
such as political violence. 
If empathy biases and naïve realism are a consequence of the human con-
dition, and these psychological biases are present at the interpersonal as 
well as intergroup levels, is there any way to get past them? Although the 
vast majority of work on cognitive biases has been devoted to categorizing 
and describing them, the few studies that have attempted to ascertain how 
stable these biases are over time provide some tentative hope. For exam-
ple, our own work (described below) has shown that, given the right inter-
vention conditions, empathy biases and higher level cognitive biases can 
be altered between different cultural groups (Americans and Mexican im-
migrants), and even groups embroiled in intractable conflict (Israelis and 
Palestinians). 
3.5.2 Conflict resolution interventions 
When two groups are in conflict, prejudice, discrimination, and open hos-
tility can thrive. Each group’s perception of the other is characterized by 
failures of empathy and perceptions of bias. Conflict resolution and preju-
dice-reduction programs aim to turn this situation around by using several 
types of interventions: perspective-taking, role playing, simulation, and 
positive intergroup contact. The general hypothesis of these programs is 
that improving attitudes for specific out-group members can enhance atti-
tudes towards the out-group as a whole, thus engendering a willingness to 
help and reluctance to harm out-group members. 
Understanding the causes and contexts of interventions, and the short and 
long-term effects of interventions on both groups, is critical to better un-
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derstanding the positive effects and unintended consequences of conflict 
resolution efforts. Unfortunately, well-controlled empirical studies of 
prejudice-reduction and conflict resolution programs remain rare, and rel-
evant data are scarce (Paluck and Green 2009). There are a handful of 
documented successful interventions. For example, Chileans’ empathy to-
wards native Mapuche, and Bosnian Serbs’ empathy towards Bosnian 
Muslims, was increased by perspective-taking (Čehajić et al. 2009). In an 
impressive large-scale field study, a radio drama in Rwanda depicting pos-
itive intergroup interactions increased empathy of Hutus towards Tutsis 
(Paluck 2009). A conflict resolution program in Sri Lanka demonstrated 
that the positive effects of interventions can be long-lasting: relative to 
control groups, Singhalese participants in a 4-day intergroup workshop 
expressed enhanced empathy towards Tamils, even a year after participat-
ing in the program (Malhotra and Liyanage 2005). Another study con-
ducted by our lab in the Middle East illustrated that positive effects from 
interventions can act very rapidly, improving attitudes of Israeli and Pales-
tinian participants for each other even after a 20-minute interaction with 
an out-group member (Bruneau and Saxe 2012). Furthermore, increased 
empathy can lead to improved attitudes towards, and willingness to help 
the out-group (Batson et al. 1997; Hodson 2008; Pettigrew and Tropp 
2008). For example, increasing empathy increased donations to an out-
group charity (Malhotra and Liyanage 2005), and forgiveness for past 
atrocities (Cehajic et al. 2008). 
However, perhaps more striking than the handful of successes is the 
dearth of successful interventions. In fact, while success is possible, inter-
ventions designed to improve intergroup attitudes are often ineffective, 
and empathy, positive attitudes, and helpful intentions toward an out-
group can also decrease following perspective-taking. For example, 
metastereotypes—thoughts about how one (as a majority group member) 
may be evaluated by an out-group member—are activated when individu-
als empathize with an out-group member in the context of an intergroup 
interaction. These thoughts have the deleterious effect of interrupting oth-
er-focused empathic responses that are required for prejudice reduction. 
Moreover, among relatively high-prejudice participants, empathy-
induction can elicit overtly negative reactions to a nearby out-group 
member (Vorauer and Sasaki 2009). 
Intergroup interventions can also fail for one of the groups involved. A me-
ta-analysis of conflict resolution programs based on the “Contact Hypoth-
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esis” found that, although the programs generally improve attitudes of the 
majority group towards the minority group, they are ineffective for im-
proving attitudes of minority group members towards the majority group 
(Tropp and Pettigrew 2005). Similarly, an intervention in the Middle East 
fashioned after Sesame Street was generally successful at improving atti-
tudes of Israelis towards Palestinians, but not the other way around (Cole 
et al. 2003). This raises the possibility that interventions may interact with 
group membership to produce asymmetric effects. There is ample anecdo-
tal evidence, and some longitudinal data (Hammack 2011), to suggest that 
attitudes of disempowered group members may even get worse over time, 
as they return from their intergroup encounter with trust and hope to find 
structural inequality intact. Generating temporary intergroup trust may 
therefore provide a short-term gain that sets up the potential for a negative 
rebound. Although the idea that asymmetric power may interact with in-
terventions has received little attention, recent studies have supported this 
notion. For example, a more “assimilationist” orientation more effectively 
predicts positive interracial orientations among majority group members, 
while “integration” representations are more effective at predicting posi-
tive interracial orientations among minority group members (Dovidio et 
al. 2001; Van Oudenhoven et al. 1998; Verkuyten and Brug 2004). 
Our own work shows an asymmetric effect of intervention type on atti-
tudes of Israelis and Palestinians towards each other. In a study conducted 
simultaneously in Tel Aviv and Ramallah, Israelis and Palestinians were 
exposed to a member of the other group in a surprise, on-line interaction 
in which they either wrote about “one or two of the most difficult aspects 
of life in [their] country” (“perspective-giving”), or read what a member of 
the other group wrote about this topic, summarizing that view at the end 
(“perspective-taking”). We found that Israeli biases towards Palestinians 
significantly changed only in the perspective-taking condition, and Pales-
tinian biases towards Israelis significantly changed only in the perspective-
giving condition (Bruneau and Saxe 2012). This pattern was replicated in 
Arizona when the same study was conducted with Mexican immigrants 
and white Arizonans, suggesting that the effectiveness of the interaction 
depends upon group power. Two pieces of evidence suggest that the bene-
fits for Palestinians in the perspective-giving condition were not due only 
to speaking, but hinged critically on feeling “heard”: first, the amount of 
positive change was correlated with how well they felt their Israeli partner 
summarized what they had said (and was independent of how sympathetic 
they felt their interaction partner was), and second, there was no change in 
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intergroup bias following a control condition where Palestinians wrote 
about the same topic, but had no interaction partner. 
3.5.3 Potential applications of social science 
One of the challenges faced by the U.S. is how to decrease anti-American 
sentiment and prevent violent attacks on U.S. citizens. Here we have high-
lighted a couple of psychological forces, both “hot” and “cold,” that could 
drive an individual towards violence: an intergroup empathy gap (simul-
taneously providing the “gas” to protect your group, and relieving the 
“brake” to aggress against the “other”) and a perception of out-group irra-
tionality based on naïve realism. We have also examined a number of con-
flict resolution efforts, both by social scientists and private organizations, 
that have tried to address intergroup biases. The successes and failures of 
experimental manipulations and conflict resolution efforts provide useful 
lessons for people hoping to improve attitudes of others towards the U.S. 
3.5.3.1 Framing can mitigate intergroup biases 
Increasing the perception of group similarity can lessen both “hot” and 
“cold” intergroup biases. This frame can even be established by essentially 
meaningless graphical representations. Framing information about group 
members in short narratives also decreases the intergroup empathy bias; 
the effect of narrative framing on “cold” cognitive biases has not yet been 
examined. 
3.5.3.2 It is dangerous to rely on one’s own (or one’s group’s) intuitions 
regarding possible interventions for another group 
The past research on conflict resolution programs reviewed here suggests 
that these efforts are often unproductive or even counter-productive, par-
ticularly for the disempowered group members. Formal conflict resolution 
programs are generally started by extremely well meaning members of the 
empowered group; social scientists are predominantly white males. It is 
possible that the intuitions brought by these people selectively serve the 
psychological needs only of the empowered group, often with the unin-
tended consequence of driving the disempowered group even further 
away. 
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3.5.3.3 When engaging across group boundaries, it matters who speaks (and 
whether they perceive that they were heard) 
A recent audit of dialogue programs in Israel found that the less Palestini-
ans spoke (relative to Israelis), the less effective the program was for the 
Palestinian participants (Hammack 2011). Our work suggests that this ef-
fect is causal: members of the relatively disempowered groups benefit 
most when they are given the opportunity to speak (and feel heard). Peo-
ple who perceive the U.S. as their “enemy out-group” may therefore bene-
fit from being given a forum to speak, as long as the listener is able to 
make them feel understood (but not necessarily agreed with). This also 
suggests that members of the most disempowered group should be given 
the floor first during negotiations. 
3.5.4 Summary 
The psychological edifice erected between group members, often without 
their conscious awareness, combines with socio-political barriers to drive 
members of conflict groups towards aggressive intergroup behaviors and 
away from intergroup reconciliation. Crucially, group membership inter-
acts with these psychological forces, potentially rendering uniform inter-
ventions less effective for one of the groups; in some conditions, well 
meaning interventions aimed at decreasing intergroup hostilities can even 
have an ironic effect. 
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3.6 Neurobiology of sacred values and implications for radicalization 
process 
Dr. Greg Berns 
3.6.1 Introduction 
Beliefs are components of the brain’s model of the world within which it 
resides. Beliefs help interpret states of the world, formulate predictions of 
events of the world, and influence courses of action to take or not take in 
response to those interpretations and predictions. Consequently, knowing 
the beliefs held by others can inform estimates, and explanations, of ac-
tions (or reactions) based on those beliefs (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010). 
However, as beliefs vary widely across contexts and content, all beliefs are 
